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Under Sticky Wages 
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by James G. Hoehn 
A major problem that monetary authorities must 
address is that contracts are made in nominal 
terms. During the contract interval, the terms 
may become inappropriate and cause misalloca- 
tions if  one of the parties has discretion over 
activity levels. 
The prototype case emphasized by macroecon- 
omists is that of the labor contract, which may 
run for three years, during which the nominal 
wage is stuck, despite changes in the marginal 
productivity and disutility of labor caused by var- 
ious events. Employers have some discretion over 
employment levels and can improve profits by 
adjusting employment in response to changes in 
the state of the economy. The profit-maximizing 
employment level will not, generally, be the 
same as the socially optimal level because the 
wage is stuck and does not perfectly reflect 
changes in the disutility of labor. An optimal 
monetary policy has the effect of tending to 
make the real wage match the marginal disutility 
of work in various states of the economy. 
This article explores how the money supply can 
be manipulated by the Federal Reserve to keep 
the real wage close to the marginal disutility of 
work in various states of the economy, and there- 
by minimize social welfare losses associated with 
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the employment distortions arising from sticky 
wages. The primary contribution of the analysis 
is to provide a social welfare metric defined in 
terms of the outcomes of an IS-LM Phillips Curve 
model. Simulations are run to compare the social 
loss under various monetary policies, including 
the one that is optimal in the model, as well as 
policies that target money, output, nominal 
income, and the price level. The simulations are 
not intended to encompass all possible struc- 
tures of the economy, but instead are meant to 
suggest how various policies might compare 
under the assumptions of the model in meeting 
the social goal of labor-market efficiency. 
I.  Employment Distortion 
Under Nominal 
Wage Contracts 
According to the basic neoclassical theory of 
wage determination, wages tend to be set at a 
level that reflects both productivity and disutility 
of work. If  the nominal wage is set in advance, it 
will tend to be set at a level equal to the 
expected marginal revenue product of labor and 
the marginal disutility of work. Then, the real 
wage will be expected, on average, to clear the 
labor market, and employment will be at optimal 
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power or other such sources of externalities, 
which are not essentially monetary problems 
because there is little the monetary authorities 
can do  to ameliorate them). 
Once the nominal wage is set, unanticipated 
events can render that wage incorrect and cause 
misallocation. For example, if  the demand for 
commodities rises beyond what was expected at 
the time contracts were signed, and if  monetary 
policy keeps the money supply constant, the 
price level will rise, lowering the real wage 
under contracts. This reduction in the real wage 
will tend to cause an expansion of employment 
by profit-maximizing firms. In an extreme case 
of period-by-period profit-maximization, the 
expansion of employment would carry to the 
point at which the marginal product of labor falls 
to the lower real wage. This expansion of 
employment is socially inappropriate because 
the additional employment produces less value 
of output than the disutility of work it incurs. 
To take another example of how predeter- 
mined wages can result in inefficiency, consider 
an autonomous cyclical labor productivity 
improvement. Further assume, for illustration, 
that as output supply increases, the price level is 
kept from falling by monetary expansion. The 
profit-maximizing firms expand employment in 
order to take advantage of the higher productivity, 
but will not face increasing unit labor costs if  the 
contract calls for employees to  supply all the labor 
the firm wants at a predetermined wage. Employ- 
ment will overexpand because firms are not 
required to consider the rising disutility of work. 
Ideally, real wages should be regulated by pol- 
icy so that they match the marginal disutility of 
work. In the case of an autonomous cyclical labor 
productivity shock, real wages should rise to 
keep pace with the rise in the disutility of work 
associated with higher employment. A monetary 
policy that tended to allow the price level to fall 
when autonomous increases in labor productivity 
occur could help real wages match the marginal 
disutility of work. Then, the employment level 
would still rise with productivity improvements, 
but not excessively so. One policy that tends to 
set up a negative relation between labor produc- 
tivity shocks and the price level is a nominal 
income, or GNP, target. In simulations with a 
model, GNP targets are close to optimal in that 
people's time tends to be allocated between 
labor and leisure in an appropriate way. 
11.  A Simulation Model 
The simulation model combines the notion of 
sticky wages and the IS-LM demand apparatus 
with autonomous labor productivity shocks. 
Elsewhere, I have shown that a simpler 
(constant-velocity) version of the model can 
account for stylized facts, such as the natural-rate 
hypothesis and the mild procyclicity of real 
wages and productivity (see Hoehn [I9881  ),  so 
long as forward-looking expectations guide 
nominal wage contractors. The IS-LM apparatus 
for representing intuitions about demand is pre- 
ferred here over simple velocity equations, 
because the effects of monetary policy can be 
offset or enhanced by changes in velocity, and 
because IS-LM allows assessment of the informa- 
tion policymakers can obtain from observations 
on the nominal interest rate. The model has 
three shocks: to money demand, to commodity 
demand, and to the marginal labor productivity 
schedule. These features provide a model con- 
sistent with the stylized facts and containing util- 
itarian welfare criteria for policy. 
Relative to the standard macroeconomic mod- 
els involving wage stickiness, four changes are 
offered to make a useful policy model. 
(i)  Expectations of inflation and productivity 
are forward-looking (Muthian rational). 
(ii)  labor productivity is subject to autono- 
mous cyclical variations (as well as to variations 
induced by shifts in commodity and labor 
demand). 
(iii)  Employment is determined not strictly by 
demand, but is also influenced by supply. 
(iv) The information content of the interest 
rate is used by goods demanders and the central 
bank. 
To incorporate these features, the following 
model is offered. 
Supply Sector 
Following Fischer (1977), represent multiyear 
nominal wage bargaining with two-period stag- 
gered, or overlapping, contracts. The model 
economy is composed of two groups of firms, 
identical in all respects, except for the date at 
which currently effective labor contracts were 
signed. Firms having signed wage contracts at the 
end of last period (  t -1) are referred to as group 
one firms, while those that signed wage con- 
tracts at the end of the period before last (t  -2) 
are referred to as group two firms. The groups 
are competitive in that they take the commodity 
price as given, and contract with workers to pay 
them their expected marginal revenue product. 
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ing the average of the two groups' firms. 
The main difference between the determina- 
tion of wages in the model here and that of 
other sticky-wage models is that contract wages 
here adjust completely and efficiently to informa- 
tion available at the time of wage bargains. In 
some other models, such as that of Taylor 
(1979), wages can take longer than a contract 
interval to respond completely to events, and are 
subject to random variations conceived of as 
wage-setting errors. Taylor's model can be justi- 
fied as more realistic. However, the model used 
here is more consistent with microeconomic 
theory about the determination of wages and is 
consistent with the natural-rate hypothesis: the 
average level of employment is invariant with 
respect to the money supply rule. 
As in most sticky-wage models, variations in 
employment are those for a representative worker. 
Implicitly, employment variations are variations 
in hours worked among workers who each have 
jobs in all states of the economy. The model falls 
short of accounting for unemployment. 
The determination of employment and wages 
reflects both Keynesian and neoclassical ele- 
ments. Hall (1980) and Barro (1977) have 
sought to reconcile the fact of sticky wages with 
the neoclassical theory of employment determi- 
nation by arguing that sticky wages need not 
have any misallocational effects. Efficient con- 
tracts, which could be implemented in the 
absence of transactions or enforcement costs, 
would involve optimal employment determina- 
tion as productivity varied, so that sticky wages 
would have no allocational effects. Here, it is 
supposed that there are constraints on optimal 
contracts that prevent workers and firms from 
effecting optimal contracts. However, the tradi- 
tional Keynesian assumption that employment is 
strictly demand-determined is softened. Instead, 
the employment reflects both the optimal level 
(the employment level associated with the inter- 
section of demand and notional supply curves) 
and the demand for labor at prevailing prices 
and wages. This is simulated by an equation for 
employment that makes it a weighted average of 
both the optimal level and the notional demand. 
The weight attached to the demand can be con- 
ceived of as the degree to which sticky wages 
have misallocational effects or, alternatively, the 
degree to which the problems of ideal contract 
enforcement are effective constraints. 
In order to derive this employment equation, 
first the notional labor demand is developed, 
then the notional labor supply is formulated, and 
then they are put together. Finally, the employ- 
ment equation, in conjunction with the produc- 
tion function and stochastic assumptions about 
productivity disturbances, implies a supply func- 
tion, or Phillips Curve: a semireduced form 
equation for output supply as a function of the 
state of technology and unexpected inflation. 
Notional Labor Demand 
A firm's production function is 
where Yit is the output of a firm in group i in 
period t, Nit is the labor input of a firm in group 
i,  and U is a global productivity shock. The 
marginal product of labor is 
In logarithmic form, output is 
where the lowercase letters3 u, and  n  are natu- 
ral logarithms of their uppercase counterparts. 
The (log of the) marginal product of labor is 
The notional demand for labor by firm i in 
period  t, n 2,  is given by the condition that the 
real wage equals the marginal product of labor: 
where wit is the (log of the) wage received by 
group  i firms' workers in period t, and p is the 
(log of the) price level. 
Notional  Labor  Supply 
The notional supply of labor to a firm is condi- 
tioned on the real wage rate:' 
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If  the labor market cleared each period, fully 
reflecting the taste and technology conditions 
underlying notional labor supply and demand, 
n 5  = n  iS, , then the employment level at firm 
i in period t would be 
These elements are sufficient to specify the 
supply sector of the economy, under the 
assumption that labor input partly reflects the 
demand, and partly reflects the optimal level: 
where Mo - [l+Pl(l-y)] -'  , 
with n  denoting the market-clearing employ. 
ment level. If  wages were not sticky, but varied 
to clear the market, they would be 
The contractual wage rate is the expectation of 
the rate that would clear the  labor market.  The con- 
tract wage for group i is found by taking the expec- 
tation of (8) conditioned on information available 
in period t-i, when the contract was signed. 
where E,,  is the operator that conditions ran- 
dom variables on realizations at t-i and earlier. 
Note that, in this formulation, the nominal wage 
will generally be  different in each of  the two 
periods subject to the contract. 
Finally, let u, be a first-order autoregressive 
process, 
W  1  The notional labor supply schedule could be derived from the primitive 
utility function: 
Co+ C,  Yl- c2N:,,  C1 > 0,  C2 >  0,  Cg > 1, 
and  the budget constraint: 
Yl=  (W1  /Pl)N1 
The first-order condition on N  is: 
c,(W,IP,) = c,c,N~~-'! 
Taking the natural logarithm and rearranging it, one obtains the labor supply 
function: 
which is the same as equation (6) of the text for Po  = In  [c ,  Ic ,c  ,I and 
p,  =  l/(c ,  - 1).  (Thanks to Charles Carlstrom for this argument.) 
The parameter + represents the degree to which 
sticky wages cause misallocations, or employ- 
ment distortions. 
Using (3), (5'1, (71, (91, (101, and (111, it can 
be shown that the (log of the) output of group 
one is 
where 
and the output of group two is 
Total output for the economy is taken as the 
average of y,  ,  and y,, : 
where 
Equation (14) provides a characterization of 
the supply sector of the economy. It shows that 
output depends on productivity variations and 
on unanticipated inflation, both with coefficients 
that depend uniquely on the elasticity of output 
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notional labor supply, P ,,  and the degree of  observed state of the economy, 0,  ,  an informa- 
misallocation, 4.  Higher P, values increase the  tion set that includes the current economywide 
responsiveness of output to productivity varia-  interest rate, R, , and the lagged state vector, 
tions; the responsiveness of output to unantici-  St _ ,  .  E :-  ,  p,  +  can differ from Et - ,  p,  + , be- 
pated inflation is proportional to 4.  cause people use the current nominal interest 
rate to update their inflation expectations.  xt is a 
stochastic demand shock. 
Demand  Sector  The money-demand function is conventional: 
The demand sector of the model is a variant of 
the familiar IS-LM apparatus, introduced in 
Hoehn (1987). The main innovation is that 
goods demanders are allowed to update their 
inflation expectations in light of the current 
nominal interest rate and to revise their assess- 
ments of the real interest rate accordingly. Much 
complexity in solutions results from this innova- 
tion. The innovation is necessary if  the authori- 
ty's use of the information in the interest rate is 
to be studied without making the implausible 
assumption that the authorities know more 
(specifically, the current interest rate) than do 
other people. The innovation ensures that any 
influence monetary policy has over real variables 
does not arise from superior information.2 
The commodity demand function, or IS curve, 
is 
where v, is the log of the quantity of money and 
v, is a first-order autoregressive random 
disturbance. 
Policy Sector 
Given the model, a policy rule that is adequate 
for the policy targets and criteria to be  consi- 
dered, is 
b, >  0,  Harberger Welfare Metric 
(16)  xt= P~x,-,+  A,, 
0 <  p2<  1, ATN  (0,~:  ) 
where 
Ef-  l~t+  1-  E [~t+lI~,l, 
Rt = observable state of economy at time t 
- 
= IR,; St- 3, 
and S -- state vector (given a specific identity in 
the next section). The nominal interest rate, R, , 
is measured as the natural logarithm of unity 
plus the coupon rate of return. The future price 
2  The effect of allowing goods demanders to extract information about 
inflation from the nominal interest rate was analyzed extensively in Hoehn 
(1987). It can reverse the usual effects of  money supply or  demand shocks on 
the price level and output during the temporary period before shocks become 
fully known to all. For  example, output and prices may temporarily rise in 
response to an increase in money demand. But such cases arise only in cases 
of  extreme policies, such as crude attempts to smooth interest rates by 
expanding money greatly in response to a rise in the interest rate, or  where 
structural parameters or relative variances of shocks take on  extreme values. 
The loss function measures a representative indi- 
vidual's frustration in obtaining an optimal alloca- 
tion of time between labor and leisure, as pro- 
ductivity and demand conditions change. The 
method, due to Harberger (1971), of measuring 
individual frustrations uses the labor supply and 
demand curves, assuming that they accurately 
reflect preferences and thereby show how 
workers and firms would want to adjust output 
and employment in response to changing pro- 
ductive opportunities. Equilibrium between 
notional supply and demand is then supposed to 
be optimal. Equilibrium values of output and 
employment in this log-linear model are a strict 
log-linear function of  u,  ,  as shown in equation 
(7). The welfare loss is taken as proportional to 
the square of the deviation of the actual from the 
optimal employment level. This welfare-loss 
metric is proportional to the area of the familiar 
Harberger welfare-loss triangles, as shown in the 
figure of the next section. 
In the model with two staggered contracting 
firm groups, an approximate measure of the 
expected Harberger welfare loss over the span of 
a contract is 
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SOURCE:  Author's calculations. 
(20)  Expected Welfare Loss  =  E (  n, ,  - n*, ,)* 
+ E(n2,- n*,,)2, 
where the nit are actual employment levels and 
the n*,  are the market-clearing employment 
levels of equation (7). This measure is the sum 
of the variances of employment from optimal for 
each of the two periods of any contracting firm, 
during which it will first be a group-one firm, 
and then a group-two firm. 
Ill.  How Policy Can 
Minimize  Employment 
Distortions 
To  understand how a well-chosen policy rule 
can improve welfare, it is useful to examine the 
nature of the money-supply responses to various 
shocks that would fully prevent employment dis- 
tortions. Such a degree of success is not possible 
in reality because of policymaker uncertainty 
about shocks. In the model simulations, it is 
assumed that the authorities know the structure 
of the economy, the current interest rate, and the 
lagged state of the economy; the authorities do 
not have full information about current shocks. 
This complicates analysis, motivating a heuristic 
treatment of the simpler case in which the 
authorities know the full state and can change 
the money supply continuously to keep employ- 
ment for both groups of firms at the ideal level. 
Readers interested in the final-form solution and 
the optimal policy rule in the full model may 
find them available in Hoehn (1989). 
The optimal employment level for each group, 
n*, , is determined by the intersection of the 
marginal product of labor schedule, MPL, , and 
the labor supply or marginal disutility of work 
schedule, nS  , as shown in the figure. This 
employment level will be chosen by firms only if 
the real wage is equal to (w/p)*,  . (This state- 
ment holds true for any degree of misallocation, 
4 , except zero, in which case nominal wage 
stickiness cannot create employment distortion. 
The case illustrated here is the simple case of 
pure demand-determination of employment, 
4 = 1. Of course, the size of employment distor- 
tions will be smaller if  4 is a fraction.) 
The optimal employment level and the real 
wage that will induce firms to choose the 
optimal employment level vary with autono- 
mous labor productivity shocks. For example, a 
cyclical improvement in labor productivity raises 
the optimal employment level and the asso- 
ciated real wage. The figure illustrates this with a 
shift in the marginal product of labor schedule 
from MPL,  to MPL, ,  which raises the optimal 
employment level to n*,.  This optimal level will 
be chosen by firms if the real wage rises to 
(w/p)T  . 
The productivity shock case reveals the subop- 
timality of a price-stabilization policy. Because 
nominal wages are fured during the contract 
interval, stable prices imply that the real wage 
would remain at the initial level of (  w/p)*,  . 
Firms would choose the employment level 
n,, at which the marginal product equals the 
unchanged real wage. The expansion of 
employment from n*, to n, is an excessive 
response to the improvement in productivity, 
because the marginal disutility of work exceeds 
the marginal product of labor for employment 
levels above n*,. The Harberger welfare loss tri- 
angle is BAD. 
To prevent firms from overexpansion, the 
monetary authorities should allow the price level 
to fall by enough to raise the real wage to 
(w/p)*,  . Somewhat ironically, this policy will 
involve an expansion in the money supply. If  the 
money stock were unchanged, the price level 
would fall too much as output rose. For exam- 
ple, if  the velocity of money were constant and 
the quantity of money were constant, then a 
productivity improvement would raise the mar- 
ginal product of labor and-via deflation-raise 
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leaving the profit-maximizing level of employ- 
ment at n*,  . The labor market is then at point 
F  in the figure, with welfare loss triangle EFA. 
The optimal policy response to the productivity 
shock is to expand the money supply enough to 
moderate the deflation, so that real wages rise to 
( w/p)T , but no  further. 
The shift from point E to point F in response 
to the productivity improvement will always be 
obtained under a nominal income target, 
because that shift lowers the price level and 
raises the output level by the same proportion, 
leaving their product unchanged. In the simula- 
tions with the IS-LM demand apparatus, the 
velocity of money falls with favorable productiv- 
ity shocks. Consequently, the nominal income 
target will necessarily require increases in money 
to obtain point F.  If  the increase in money is 
not forthcoming, as under a constant-money pol- 
icy, the price level will fall more than one-for- 
one with the productivity improvement, and the 
profit-maximizing employment level falls below 
n*,  . The welfare loss resulting from sticky wages 
under a productivity shift is greater under a con- 
stant money policy than under the nominal 
income target, once velocity changes are 
accounted for. 
The optimal policy response to a commodity- 
demand or money-demand shock is easier to 
understand than the optimal response to a pro- 
ductivity shock. In the model as specified, such 
shocks do not alter either the marginal product 
of labor schedule or the marginal disutility of 
work. Consequently, the optimal level of 
employment is unchanged. The optimal policy 
will attempt to prevent the employment level 
from changing with demand and money shocks. 
Employment can be insulated from distortions 
arising from such shocks by a policy that stabi- 
lizes the price level. A stable price level prevents 
the real wage from changing, preventing firms 
from desiring a change in employment. Money 
supply should be decreased with increased 
commodity demand by an amount adequate to 
prevent inflation. Money supply should be 
increased one-for-one with increases in the 
money-demand function. 
A policy of output stabilization is unambigu- 
ously worse than a policy of price stabilization. 
Both of these policies give an appropriate 
response to commodity-demand and money- 
demand shocks, but the distortion concurrent 
with a productivity shock is unambiguously 
larger under the output stabilization policy. As 
soon as a single-minded output-stabilizing 
authority observes a productivity improvement, it 
will deflate the price level by reducing the 
money supply. The result is deflation sufficient 
to drive the real wage above (  w/p),  , and 
employment declines below nz ,  say to n,; . 
The ability of the authority to stabilize output 
in this example is limited because recontracting 
firms can offset the real-wage effects of excessive 
deflation by lowering nominal wages. As soon as 
one of the groups recontracts, it will reduce 
wages to aim at an increased employment level, 
driving the authorities to further reduce 
employment in the second group via yet more 
deflation. The second group cannot protect itself 
against the negative employment distortions by 
recontracting for lower nominal wages until one 
more period passes and the old contract expires. 
The second group's employment must be 
reduced, if output is to be stabilized, by enough 
to offset not only the economywide increase in 
productivity, but must also offset the increase in 
employment at the recontracting firms, who will 
rationally anticipate deflation and reduce wages 
to allow employment to increase to the optimal 
employment level. Because the loss function is 
the sum of squared group employment distor- 
tions, the concentration of the employment dis- 
tortion in the second group of firms leads to a 
sizeable welfare loss. 
IV.  A  Numerical 
Simulation 
In order to illustrate how various policy rules 
influence employment distortions arising from 
sticky wages, a simulation can be conducted 
with particular numerical values for structural 
parameters. The values chosen for this simula- 
tion were the following: 
The elasticity of labor supply with respect to 
the cyclical variations in the real wage was set at 
one-half, an arbitrary but plausible value. The 
elasticity of output with respect to labor input, 
y , was set at the midpoint of its permissible 
range, also arbitrary but plausible. The value 
assigned to the money demand elasticity with 
respect to the nominal interest rate, a,  ,  implies, 
for example, that an increase in the rate from 5 
to 6 percent would, for given levels of income 
and prices, lower real money demand by 
approximately 1.9 percent. The money-demand 
elasticity with respect to output, a,  ,  was set at 
somewhat less than unity, as suggested by 
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Parametera  Money  Output  Price Level  Nominal Income  Optimal 
4  0.0  +1.06  -0.05  +0.62  +0.48 
11.1  0.0  -1.97  +3.35  +1.73  +2.06 
11.2  0.0  -2.44  -1.56  -2.10  -  1.98 
11.3  0.0  +0.80  +0.80  +0.80  +0.80 
11.4  0.0  b  -0.84  -0.04  b 
a.  The money supply rule is mt  = qRt + p1 ut -  + p2 xt -  + p3 vt -  + p4 Et -  ut - I, where u, x, and v are disturbances to goods demand, 
goods supply, and money demand. 
b. The policy parameter p4 is irrelevant to the criterion. In simulations, p4  is set to zero. 
SOURCE:  Author's calculations. 
Policy Criterion 
Innovation  Money  Output  Price Level  Nominal Income  Optimal 
Productivity 
t  0.0  -0.11  +0.01  -0.06  -0.06 
t-  1  0.0  -2.17  +3.41  +1.25  +1.33 
t-  2  0.0  -1.81  +2.05  +0.98  +1.06 
Goods Demand 
t  0.0  +0.25  -0.01  +0.15  +0.12 
t-  1  0.0  -1.60  -  1.60  -  1.60  -  1.60 
t-  2  0.0  -  1.28  -  1.28  -  1.28  -1.28 
Money Demand 
t  0.0  +0.31  -0.02  +0.19  +0.15 
t-  1  0.0  +0.80  +0.80  +0.80  +0.80 
t-  2  0.0  +0.64  +0.64  +0.64  +0.64 
SOURCE:  Author's calculations. 
abstract analysis of the transactions demand for 
money. The commodity-demand elasticity with 
respect to the real interest rate, b,  , was set to 
unity because, of all (equally arbitrary) values, 
unity is the most straightforward choice. (Econo- 
metric evidence currently available does not 
provide direct knowledge of this elasticity.) The 
relative sizes of the disturbances give consider- 
able scope to demand-side influences on output 
and employment, and allow for a relatively 
unstable money-demand function. 
In the basic simulation, firms were assumed to 
choose employment to equate the marginal prod- 
uct of labor with the real wages, so 4 = 1. In a 
second simulation, 4 was set equal to one-third, 
in order to see whether the results of the basic 
simulation were robust with respect to this 
parameter. 
Five different policy rules were simulated, 
with their response coefficients chosen so as to 
target (1)  money, (2)  output, (3)  the price level, 
(4)  nominal income, or (5) optimal employ- 
ment. The last of these is, of course, the only 
optimal policy by the criterion employed, but it 
is instructive to compare results of other poten- 
tial targets. 
The policy rules' response coefficients, q and 
the pi,  are displayed in table 1. The final-form 
solution for the money supply is determined by 
both these coefficients and the solution for the 
nominal interest rate (because of the qR, term in 
the money supply rule), and is shown in table 2 
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shocks to:  Money  Output  Price Level  Nominal Income  Optimal 
Productivity  2.86  14.99  1.80  0.38  0.19 
Goods demand  6.91  3.04  1.96  2.47  2.35 
Money demand  4.52  0.24  1.28  0.66  0.76 
TOTAL LOSS  14.29  18.27  5.04  3.51  3.30 
SOURCE:  Author's calculations. 
for each of the five alternative policies. In the 
immediate period of impact, the monetary 
authority's response to a shock is equal to q , its 
interest rate response coefficient, times the 
response of the interest rate to the shock. For 
example, under a policy of stabilizing output, the 
money supply is increased 1.06 for each one- 
point change in the interest rate. A productivity 
shock in period t reduces the interest rate by 
-0.10 (not shown in tables) under this policy rule, 
so the response of money at time t to a produc- 
tivity shock in period t is 1.06 times -0.10, or 
about -0.11. 
Only after one period has passed can the 
monetary authority observe all three shocks 
independently and tailor its response to each 
one separately. For example, the output-stabiliz- 
ing policy contracts the money supply by 2.17 at 
time t for a one-unit innovation to productivity 
in the previous period, E  -  . This response 
reflects two channels: first, an indirect channel 
involving the change in the interest rate, -0.19, 
times the response coefficient q = 1.06, or about 
-0.20. To this is added the direct response coef- 
ficient on t - 1 productivity, p1  = -1.97. Together, 
these add to -2.17, the total contraction of the 
money supply required to prevent period-t out- 
put from responding to period t - 1 productivity 
innovations. A similar calculation involving direct 
and indirect effects finds that the output- 
stabilizing policy contracts the money supply at 
time t by 1.81 in response to a unit productivity 
innovation in period t -  2. 
Aside from the constant-money policy, the pol- 
icies considered are identical in their money- 
supply responses to goods demand or money 
demand shocks, once these shocks are observed. 
In this model, all the activist targets are essentially 
equivalent in terms of the implied response of 
the money supply to these demand-side shocks. 
The main difference  among the active money- 
supply policies lies in the response of money to 
productivity shocks. The output-stabilizing poli- 
cy's response is too restrictive; it contracts 
money at time t by 2.17 after a unit productivity 
innovation in period t -  1, contrasting with an 
optimal increase of 1.33. The price-stabilization 
rule responds too expansively; it expands the 
money supply by 3.41. The nominal income 
target's response is to expand the money supply 
by 1.25, very close to optimal. These differences 
among alternative active policies in their 
response to productivity shocks account for the 
relative rankings of their efficiency. 
Ekpected welfare losses under alternative pol- 
icies, shown in table 3, are the sum of the mean 
squared deviations of group one and group two 
employment levels from optimal employment 
levels. Given the information constraint the 
authority faces, it can reduce this loss measure to 
3.30 using the optimal policy. Most of this loss, 
2.35, is attributable to goods-demand shocks 
occurring in the current period; a small fraction 
is attributable to productivity shocks occurring in 
the current period. Distortions due to shocks in 
period t -  1 can be completely eliminated by 
policy responses, while distortions due to t -  2 
or earlier shocks are eliminated by wage recon- 
tracting by both groups of firms. 
The nominal income targeting policy is close 
to optimal; its welfare loss is 3.51, only slightly 
higher than for the optimal policy. The output- 
stabilizing policy is far worse, with a total 
expected loss of 18.27, most of which is due to 
productivity shocks. The constant-money policy 
is not much better than the output-stabilizing 
policy; it generates substantial employment dis- 
tortions in the face of goods-demand and 
money-demand shocks, which the activist poli- 
cies make active efforts to prevent. Finally, the 
price-stabilization policy results in somewhat 
greater losses than the nominal income policy, 
but results in much smaller losses than the out- 
put or money targeting policies. 
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Innovation  Money  Output  Price Level  Nominal Income  Optimal 
Productivity 
t  -0.28  -0.34  -0.28  -0.32  -0.30 
t-  1  -  1.64  -3.84  +  1.28  -0.42  0.0 
t-  2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Goods Demand 
t  +0.70  +0.88  +0.70  +0.78  +0.76 
t-  1  +1.58  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
t-  2  0 .o  0 .o  0 .o  0.0  0.0 
Money Demand 
t  -0.38  -0.16  -0.36  -0.26  -0.28 
t-  1  -0.80  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
t-  2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
SOURCE: Author's calculations. 
Loss  due to  Policy Criterion 
shocks to:  Money  Output  Price Level  Nominal Income  Optimal 
Productivity  0.51  1.03  0.21  0.05  0.04 
Goods demand  1.37  0.60  0.44  0.54  0.54 
Money demand  0.83  0.14  0.32  0.22  0.22 
TOTAL LOSS  2.72  1.78  0.98  0.80  0.79 
SOURCE:  Author's calculations. 
The deviations of employment from optimal 
for the two groups can be read from table 4. The 
table lists the deviations for the second group; the 
deviations for the first group, (  n, ,  - n*,  ,), are the 
same as for the second group for period-t 
shocks, but recontracting by this group makes 
the period - t employment distortion equal to 
zero for t -  1 or earlier shocks. A one-unit inno- 
vation in productivity at time t raises the optimal 
employment level for both groups by 0.40 in 
time t . Given that the effect of an innovation on 
the marginal productivity schedule decays at the 
rate p,  = .8, optimal employment increases by 
0.32 and by about 0.26 in response to unit pro- 
ductivity innovations in periods t -  1 and t -  2. 
The gross suboptimality of the output- 
stabilizing policy reflects the employment distor- 
tion in the second, nonrecontracting, group, in 
response to a productivity innovation in period 
t -  1. Because policy responds by contracting the 
money supply, generating deflation and an 
excessive rise in the real wage for the nonrecon- 
tracting group, employment for that group falls 
by 3.52, in sharp contrast with the increase of 
0.32 in optimal employment. The distortion is 
then -3.84. In order to keep output fured, the 
authorities must reduce employment in the 
second group, and this reduction must be 
enough to offset both the economywide produc- 
tivity improvement and the rise in employment 
by 0.32 in the first, recontracting,  group. 
The GNP targeting policy is very close to 
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to shocks to:  Money  Output  Price Level  Nominal Income  Optimal 
Productivity  0.0  -1.51  +8.76  +3.10  +3.48 
Goods demand  0.0  +0.22  -0.01  +0.12  +0.09 
Money demand  0.0  -  1.95  +0.02  -0.12  -0.11 
CORREIATION  -  -0.30  +0.59  +0.30  +0.34 
SOURCE:  Author's calculations. 
I 
I 
I  - 
optimal. It handles money-demand and 
commodity-demand variations appropriately, and 
generates a mild and nearly optimal deflation in 
response to productivity improvements. The 
degree of closeness to optimality depends on 
various parameters, but is not, it appears, sensi- 
tive to the degree to which sticky wages cause 
misallocations, 4 , at least at the chosen values 
of the other structural parameters. Table 5 shows 
the welfare losses in the model for 4 = 1/3. 
The output targeting policy is generally the 
worse in terms of employment distortion 
(except when 4 = 1/3, when the constant- 
money policy is worse). The output targeting 
policy generates the greatest losses when pro- 
ductivity shocks occur. Output targets handle 
commodity- and money-demand shocks, how- 
ever, in an appropriate manner. 
The price-stabilization policy results in over- 
employment when a productivity improvement 
occurs. The policy is too stimulative; it does not 
provide for the deflation required to raise the 
real wage in line with marginal productivity at 
the new optimal employment level. In the case 
of commodity- and money-demand shocks, 
however, a policy of price stabilization provides 
essentially the same optimal response as does 
the nominal and real GNP targets. 
The constant-money policy accrues losses in 
the case of all kinds of shocks. The loss attend- 
ing productivity shocks is less than in the case of 
the output target, but the money-targeting policy 
fails to respond appropriately to commodity- or 
money-demand shocks. In the simulation, the 
constant-money policy results in less employ- 
ment distortion than the output-stabilizing pol- 
icy, unless the degree of misallocation is small, 
such as 4 = 1/3. 
V.  Conclusion 
A monetary policy that seeks to aid wage con- 
tractors in avoiding employment distortions due 
to sticky wages will attempt to keep the real 
wage equal to the marginal disutility of labor in 
all states of the economy. Such a policy will 
require money supply expansion when cyclical 
improvements in labor productivity occur. To 
the extent that productivity variations are an 
important factor in the business cycle, the 
optimal money supply rule will involve a posi- 
tive correlation between money and output. (See 
table 6.) Hence, the belief, common among 
economists, that sticky-wage models argue for a 
countercyclical or output-stabilizing policy is not 
necessarily correct, once productivity shocks are 
taken account of. 
In simulations, it was found that a nominal 
income target might be reasonably close to the 
optimal policy. This result is useful because the 
Federal Reserve may not be able to predict and 
target optimal employment levels because of 
uncertainty about the structural parameters and 
shock variances needed in a welfare analysis, yet 
can probably predict and target nominal income 
using its models and judgmental forecasters. 
After all, the main objective of macroeconomet- 
ric models has been the prediction and potential 
control of national income. The analysis of this 
paper tends to give additional justification to 
proposals for nominal income targeting, includ- 
ing those by Meade (1978), Tobin (1980), Hall 
(1983), Gordon (1985), and McCallum (1987). 
The relative near-optimality of a nominal 
income target might not be robust to all con- 
ceivable values of the labor market parameters, 
y and p ,,  however. For example, if  the marginal 
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to zero), and/or if  the notional labor supply 
curve is nearly horizontal (Dl very large), then a 
price target will do  as well or better than a nom- 
inal income target. More precisely, if 
Mo = [l  + P1(l - y  )] -'  is close to unity, then a 
nominal income target will be close to optimal, 
but if Mo is close to zero, then a price level 
target will be close to optimal.3 In the simula- 
tion, y  = 1/2 and P, = 1/2, so Mo  = .8, which is 
rather close to unity. In order to adequately con- 
firm the relative efficiency of a nominal income 
target relative to a price target, econometric evi- 
dence and a sensitivity analysis are needed to 
rule out small values of Mo . In general, the 
optimal policy response to a productivity 
improvement will be one that is less stimulative 
than that implied by a price target and more stim- 
ulative than that implied by a nominal income 
target. 
If  the specification of the model were modi- 
fied to allow for costs of changing commodity 
prices ("menu costs"), or to allow for some 
degree of commodity price stickiness, then a 
price-targeting policy might yet be better than a 
nominal income target. Many other elements of 
more detailed macroeconometric models have 
unknown implications for the welfare analysis. 
Much more research along these lines is needed 
for an adequate welfare analysis of monetary pol- 
icy toward the business cycle. 
Glossary of  Variables 
and  Parameters 
Endogenous Variables 
output 
output of group 1 firms 
output of group 2 firms 
price level 
nominal interest rate 
money stock 
wage rate 
market-clearing wage rate 
employment 
employment of group 1 firms 
employment of group 2 firms 
optimal employment level 
Exogenous Variables 
innovation to the productivity  disturbance, u 
h  innovation to the commodity-demand dis- 
turbance, x 




or Observed Slate 
Parameters 
All nonpolicy parameters are nonnegative. 
a,  =  elasticity of money demand with respect to 
interest rate =  dln (M/P )/din  (1 + R  ) 
a,  =  elasticity of money demand with respect 
to output 
6, =  elasticity of aggregate demand with respect 
to real interest rate 
p, =  elasticity of notional labor supply with 
respect to real wage 
y =  elasticity of output with respect to 
labor input 
q =  coefficient of money-supply response to 
interest rate 
pi  =  coefficients of money-supply response to 
lagged state variables (see equation 19 of 
the text) 
=  variance of productivity innovation 
=  variance of commodity-demand innovation 
02  7-  - variance of money-demand innovation 
3  Bean (1983) apparently was the first to note this. 
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